The collective sigh of relief from the legal profession was palpable on 31st March when the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in the Julia Mazur & others v CILEX & others [2026] (‘Mazur’) case, overturning the High Court decision from September last year regarding who could carry on the ‘conduct of litigation’, one of the ‘reserved legal activities’ (reserved to ‘authorised’ people, such as solicitors and legal executives with practising rights) in the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA).
High Court decision – September 2025
The High Court, with the help of the SRA and Law Society, concluded that whilst non-authorised people (such as Legal Executives (without practising rights), paralegals and trainee solicitors) could support or assist authorised people with the conduct of litigation, they could not carry it out themselves under their supervision. This distinction has caused much soul-searching and head-scratching for the last 6 months, with people asking where the line was between ‘working under supervision’ and ‘assisting someone with work’.
What was the case about?
In the original case, an employee (Mr Middleton) of an SRA regulated firm (Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (GBS)), who did not himself hold a practising certificate and therefore was not himself an ‘authorised person’ able to carry on the conduct of litigation under the LSA, signed the court documents and appeared to be conducting the litigation, leading to the argument that both he and GBS had breached the LSA (thereby committing a criminal offence under section 14) and the debt recovery proceedings against Julia Mazur should be struck out.
Various arguments were raised on behalf of Mr Middleton and GBS, including the argument (with which the Court of Appeal has ultimately agreed) that Mr Middleton’s work in relation to the case was supervised at all times by a solicitor at GBS (Mr Ashall) who was the person carrying on the conduct of litigation. Unfortunately for all those affected by the High Court decision, in particular those who lost their jobs as a result of it, it has taken 6 months for those initial arguments to be upheld. Indeed, the Court of Appeal when accepting this argument, stated “…it is hard to see why this litigation went on as long as it did”.
Court of Appeal decision – March 2026
Thankfully, the Court of Appeal concluded that the High Court (and therefore the SRA and The Law Society) was wrong to have found this distinction and has confirmed that it is lawful for an unauthorised person to carry out this work as long as they are doing so ‘for and on behalf of an authorised individual’ under their genuine and effective supervision. (We will come back to the importance of supervision below).
Court of Appeal’s reasoning
- There has always been a widespread and well-regulated practice of delegation by solicitors to unqualified individuals.
- This practice of delegation did not absolve solicitors of their professional responsibilities for the performance of the person undertaking delegated duties.
- The LSA never intended to change this.
- An unauthorised person may lawfully perform any tasks, which are within the scope of the conduct of litigation, for and on behalf of an authorised individual such as a solicitor or appropriately authorised CILEX member, provided the authorised individual retains responsibility for the tasks delegated to the unauthorised person. In that situation, the authorised individual is the person carrying on the conduct of litigation.
In relation to Mr Middleton, the Court of Appeal concluded that he was never actually ‘conducting litigation’ because he was carrying out the work for and on behalf of his supervising solicitor under his adequate supervision.
The importance of genuine supervision
It is vital to be aware that the Court of Appeal’s conclusions are very much predicated on the authorised individual providing “proper direction, management, supervision and control” of the unauthorised person’s work. Whilst the Court of Appeal has left the detail of what this looks like for regulators (such as the SRA) to determine, it did clarify that the degree or appropriate control and supervision will depend on the circumstances, stating that “in some circumstances the degree of appropriate control and supervision will be high, with approval required before things are done. In other, for example routine, circumstances, a lower level of control and supervision will be required. In such cases, it may be sufficient for the authorised individual to conduct regular meetings with the unauthorised person and to sample their work.” (as happened with Mr Middleton). So, supervision for one firm/ work type/ level of non-authorised staff member will not necessarily look the same as another. This provides flexibility in how you approach supervision, but also risks uncertainty and potential breaches. It will be interesting to see what further guidance our regulators provide.
The penultimate paragraph of the judgment is worth paying particular attention to when considering how you see supervision in your firms, to avoid committing a criminal offence (my emphasis added below):
“In essence, the question in any given set of circumstances will be whether the unauthorised person, in carrying out whatever tasks which fall within the scope of “conduct of litigation” have been delegated to him or her, is in truth acting on behalf of the authorised individual. If they are, it is the authorised individual who is conducting the litigation. But if the reality is that the litigation is not being conducted by the unauthorised person for and on behalf of the authorised individual, they will be committing an offence.”
What amounts to the “conduct of litigation” for which supervision will be required?
Sadly (but not surprisingly), the Court of Appeal felt unable to provide an exhaustive list of the tasks that would fall within the “conduct of litigation” definition, and this is likely to continue to cause some confusion going forwards. However, the judgment does include a helpful list of tasks unlikely to fall within the definition:
- Pre-litigation work
- Giving legal advice in connection with court proceedings
- Conducting correspondence with the opposing party on behalf of clients
- Gathering evidence
- Instructing and liaising with experts and counsel
- Signing a statement of truth in respect of a statement of case
- Signing any other document that the CPR permits to be signed by a legal representative, as defined by CPR Part 2.3 (the definition of legal representative, who can do various things pursuant to the CPR, includes “solicitor’s employee”)
What should we do now?
Whilst we await updated guidance from the SRA and The Law Society here are our thoughts on the steps firms should be considering straight away:
- Re-read the SRA’s Effective Supervision guidance (which already says it is being reviewed) and ensure your processes comply with this as much as possible.
- Understand which staff are authorised and which are non-authorised and keep a living record.
- Ensure you have an authorised individual with genuine overall conduct of each litigation matter, and staff understand who has responsibility and oversight of each task.
- Think carefully about your delegation and supervision arrangements. Ensure you have a clear written policy and process for documenting the supervision provided.
- Err on the side of caution when it comes to whether a particular task amounts to the “conduct of litigation” (subject to reference to the Court of Appeal’s list above) and always treat any formal litigation steps as falling within the definition.
- Think about the level of supervision required – is this proportionate to the complexity and risk of the case and level of seniority of the non-authorised staff member? Whilst the Court of Appeal has clarified that the law does not require strict prior approval for every step in litigation, for more junior members of non-authorised staff in particular, consider whether it would be sensible for authorised staff to sign off formal court documents/ pleadings to avoid unnecessary challenges (such as Julia Mazur’s) and as a way to evidence appropriate supervision.
- Do you have sufficient numbers of authorised people to supervise the non-authorised staff adequately and effectively?
- Document the supervision provided in each matter, including recording the time spent doing so. You need to be able to evidence effective management of your non-authorised staff.
- Beware of thinking it’s just back to pre-September ‘business as usual’ if your supervision systems left a little to be desired back then!
- High volume Claims Firms: Although the judgment confirmed that the working model adopted by Law Centres (where groups of authorised individuals delegate conduct of litigation to unauthorised persons, whilst supervising their work and retaining ultimate responsibility for it) was acceptable, High volume claims firms which adopt the same model but which may have large ratios of unauthorised to authorised staff should pay particular attention to their supervision arrangements. This has been the case for quite some time in light of the SRA’s Claims Management Activity guidance and High-Volume Financial Service Claims warning notice, but will no doubt be even more important in light of this judgment.
Additional points of note from the Judgment
- Exemptions: The conclusion that unauthorised persons can in fact conduct litigation under supervision was reached despite there being no specific ‘supervision’ exemption in Schedule 3 LSA in relation to the ‘conduct of litigation’, which there is for other reserved legal activities (namely rights of audience, reserved instrument activities and probate activities). This absence led the Law Society and Legal Services Board to conclude that parliament intended to prohibit unauthorised persons from conducting litigation under supervision. The Court of Appeal disagreed concluding that such inferences could not safely be drawn as the separate activities had “their own histories and practices”.
- Section 21(3) LSA: Confusion was caused by the SRA initially suggesting that Section 21(3) permitted employees of an authorised firm to undertake reserved activities (without needing supervision) simply by virtue of working there. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal rejected this. The SRA had erroneously conflated “regulated persons” with “authorised persons” in the LSA, the former simply being a jurisdictional definition that allows regulators to oversee the conduct of employees, as distinct from the latter who can carry out reserved activities. (The same mistake was made by CILEx in guidance to their members until 2023).
- Litigants in Person (LIPs): Whilst a LIP has a personal right to carry on the conduct of litigation on their own behalf (so they do not have to instruct a lawyer to pursue their claim if they do not wish to), that personal right cannot be delegated to a non-authorised person. Accordingly, if a non-authorised person conducts litigation on behalf of a LIP they will be in breach of the LSA.
Conclusion
Whilst this judgment will have brought relief to legal executives (and many other non-authorised persons) who suddenly found they were no longer able to undertake litigation tasks under the supervision of an authorised person, it does not bring complete relief to those highly experienced legal executives (but without practising rights because they relied on pre-2023 advice from their regulator) who have found themselves having to be supervised by junior (but qualified) solicitors with far less experience than them. Their route will likely continue to be to apply to CILEX for stand-alone practising rights.
On reading the full judgment, one does get the distinct feeling that had the SRA and Law Society not provided “assistance” to the High Court, we may not have found ourselves in this position! However, thankfully, the Court of Appeal has restored some balance and concerns about the restriction on delegation harming access to justice, consumer interests, diversity in the profession and the viability of law centres and legal aid providers have hopefully been allayed (or at least reduced), and a renewed focus on effective supervision can only be a good thing.